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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN EOLFE GASSMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, Department of Pub-
lic Safety, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 22, 1973, Plaintiff-
Respondent, Dr. John Rolfe Gassman, was stopped by 
Trooper Arlo Wilkinson for an alleged traffic violation 
involving Dr. Gassman's execution of a right-hand turn. 
After Dr. Gassman pulled to the side of the road in 
response to the trooper, he was suspected of driving 
under the influence of alcohol and was asked to perform 
certain field sobriety tests. Thereafter, Plaintiff-
Respondent was placed under arrest for driving under 
the influence. 
Case No. 13849 
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Thereafter, Trooper Wilkinson took out the appro-
priate forms and read to Dr. Gassman the provisions 
of Utah's implied consent law as contained in IT.C.A. 
41-6-44.10 (1953). After completion of his reading of 
the form, according to Dr. Gassman, Trooper Wilkinson 
asked Dr. Gassman if he would submit to a blood test. 
Dr. Gassman indicated that he would. Trooper Wilkinson 
next asked Plaintiff-Bespondent if he desired the pres-
ence of a physician to take a blood test. To this question 
Dr. Gassman responded affirmatively. No mention was 
made of a breathalizer test or of any other chemical 
test other than a blood test. 
Attempts were thereafter made to locate Plaintiff-
Bespondent's personal physician, Dr. LaVere Poulsen. 
He was unavailable. Dr. Je r ry Poulsen was apparently 
on call at Granger Medical Clinic. Dr. Gassman declined 
to ask Dr. Je r ry Poulsen to be present for personal 
reasons. After taking Dr. Gassman tn the Salt Lake 
County Jail, another unsuccessful attempt was made to 
locate Dr. LaVere Poulsen. 
After no further discussion of a blood test, Trooper 
Wilkinson asked Dr. Gassman to submit to a Breathalizer 
test, to which request Dr. Gassman refused. At this point, 
without further discussion or explanation, Trooper Wil-
kinson left the jail. 
Sometime thereafter, Trooper Wilkinson filed a 
refusal affidavit with Defendant-Appellant, and on the 
25th day of January, 1974, Defendant-Appellant, issued 
an order of revocation as to Dr. G;assmanV driving 
piiyiliges. A. .temporary restraining, order precludiiig 
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the enforcement of said revocation order was signed by-
Judge Stewart M. Hanson of the Salt Lake County Dis-
trict Court on February 25, 1974, and was served upon 
Defendant-Appellant on February 26, 1974. 
Dr. Gassman's petition to review Defendant-
Appellant's order of revocation was heard on June 19, 
1974, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. Judge Banks 
held that the evidence indicated that Plaintiff-
Eespondent did not refuse to take a chemical test within 
the meaning of U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953) and that his 
driving privileges should be fully reinstated. From this 
ruling, Defendant-Appellant has appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT DID NOT REFUSE TO TAKE A CHEMICAL 
TEST WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953). 
Despite a conflict of testimony as to which party 
first introduced the subject of a blood test, there is no 
dispute that a blood test was mutually agreed upon by 
the arresting officer and Dr. Gassman. There is also a 
slight conflict of the testimony as to whether the presence 
of a physician was first mentioned by Trooper Wilkin-
son or by Dr. Gassman; however, there is no dispute 
that Trooper Wilkinson undertook efforts to locate Gass-
man's physician, nor is there any evidence that Dr. 
Gassman refused to take a blood test without the pres-
ence of a physician. 
There is no evidence to indicate that Dr. Gassman 
was attempting to stall for time, a factor which was 
3 
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emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Hunter v. Dorms, 
23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969). In fact, Dr. Gass-
mand did not even take the opportunity to attempt to 
locate his physician after Trooper Wilkinson's efforts* 
had failed. On the contrary, the evidence seems to indi-
cate that it was the arresting officer who was concerned 
with time, as his regular shift had ended a couple of 
hours earlier. 
Once he had abandoned his efforts to locate Dr. La-
Vere Poulsen, the arresting officer apparently decided 
that a blood test would take too long, requested that Dr. 
Gassman submit to a breathalizer test, and merely left 
without further adieu once Plaintiff-Respondent indi-
cated an unwillingness to take a breathalizer test. 
Trooper Wilkkinson did not attempt to ascertain whether 
Dr. Gassman was refusing all chemical tests, nor did he 
make any effort to inform Plaintiff-Respondent of the 
consequences of a refusal. 
The evidence shows that Plaintiff-Respondent was 
lecL to believe by the arresting officer that he had the 
right to have a blood test and that he had the right to have 
a physician present while said test was performed. The 
last line of the form covering the implied consent law 
states that an arrested person is permitted to have his 
own physician administer an additional chemical test. 
Immediately after reading this line, the efforts to locate 
Dr. Poulsen were undertaken by Trooper Wilkinson. 
The csises as cited in Appellant's brief indicate that it is 
not the arrested person's state of mind that is important. 
Howeyer? that line of reasoning does not follow when the 
state of mind is induced by the arresting officer ^asiu-
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the present case. Once Trooper Wilkinson led Dr. 
Gassman to believe as he did, it was his further duty 
to clear the matter up prior to accepting the refusal of 
the breathalizer. 
POINT II 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER FAILED TO FULFILL 
HIS STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN 
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953). 
U.C.A. 41.6.10 (c) (1953), reads in part as follows: 
If such person has been placed under arrest and 
has thereafter been requested to submit to any 
one of the chemical tests provided for in subsec-
tions (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to 
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not 
be given and the arresting officer shall advise 
the person of his rights under this section . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
Under different circumstances it could be argued 
that an arresting officer's reading of the implied con-
sent material prior to the arrested person's agreement 
to or refusal of a chemical test would satisfy his obliga-
tion as set forth in the preceding quoted portion of the 
statute. However, under the circumstances of the pres-
ent case where assent to a blood test had already been 
made by Dr. Gassman and agreed to by the arresting 
officer, said officer had a statutory duty to further ex-
plain the statute and its consequences to Dr. Gassman 
once a refusal of a completely different test was made. 
The arresting officer failed to follow the clear dictates 
of the above-quoted statute. His initial reading of the 
printed form should not be allowed to apply to any and 
all refusals subsequent thereto regardless of the circum-
tanees. 
5 
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The evidence clearly indicates that Dr. Gassman 
had agreed to submit to a blood test. There is no evi-
dence that Dr. Gassman refused to take a blood test 
without his physician's presence, and there is no evi-
dence that the arresting officer requested that Dr. Gass-
man submit to a blood test in the absence of a physician. 
With this set of facts, a person could very easily 
become confused as to the consequences of his refusal to 
submit to the breath test. The arresting officer had a 
duty to be aware of said confusion and to clarify the 
matter. Since he failed to so inform Dr. Gassman, the 
statutory requirement has not been satisfied. 
POINT III 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE MAKE IT A 
MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN THIS JURISDICTION. 
None of the cases cited by Defendant-Appellant in 
its brief is applicable to the present situation and should 
not be relied upon by this Court in reaching its decision. 
Four of appellant's cited cases deal with the completely 
different situation in which an arrested person refused 
to submit to the test at all unless performed by a physi-
cian of the arrested person's choice. 
Cushman v. Tofany, 36 A.D. 2d 1000, 321 N.Y.S. 
2d 831 (1971), was such a case, and there the appellate 
court held that an arrested person could not impose 
such a condition upon his consent. In effect, his consent 
was no consent at all. 
Similar decisions were made in Breslin v. Ilults, 
20 A.D.2d 790, 218 N.Y.S. 2d 70 (1964); Wegner v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. Eptr . 920 (1969); 
6~ 
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and' Beetles v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 662 (1969). 
Sowa v. Hults, 22 A.D. 2d 730, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 294 
(1964), was a case in which the arresting officer and the 
arrested person agreed that a blood test would be given, 
as in the present situation. However, in that case the 
defendant refused to take the test without the presence 
of his physician and further refused to tell the name of 
his physician. The facts of that case boil down to nothing 
more than an outright refusal, which is not the case in 
the present stuation at all. 
Shields v. Hults, 26 A.D. 2d 971, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 760 
(1966), is closer to the present case, but it, too, is not 
controlling. In that case the arrested person demanded 
the presence of a physician, but said demand was refused 
by the arresting officer. The arresting officer attempted 
to explain the provisions of the statute, which is ap-
parently similar to Utah's, as allowing the arrested 
person to have a physician of his choice administer 
another test, but that it did not give the person an un-
qualified right to have the physician present while 
the custodial test wras administered. In the present case, 
the arresting officer could have done as the officer in 
the Shields case; however, he did not, and once the de-
cision was made to allow Dr. Gassman's physician to be 
present he had a statutory duty to follow through with 
this approach or to inform Dr. Gassman of the conse-
quences of his refusal to take the breath test. His willing-
ness to accommodate Plaintiff-Respondent only served 
to confuse him. This confusion should have been clarified 
prior to Trooper Wilkinson's leaving. 
7 
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Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E. 
2d 199 (1969), and Fallis v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles, 70 Cal. Eptr . 595 (1968), are cases in which the 
arrested party attempted to place conditions upon his 
consent, which, as previously statated, is the same as no 
consent at all. 
Maxsted v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 92 Cal. 
Rptr. 579 (1971), and Lampman v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 105 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1972), were both cases in 
which the arrested person alleged to have refused to take 
a chemical test due to confusion resulting from the read-
ing of the so-called "Miranda Warning" prior to the 
reading of the implied consent law. These cases are not 
on point because here the arrested person agreed to sub-
mit to a chemical test and did not request the presence 
of an attorney or request a conference with his attorney 
prior to deciding. 
In Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N.J. Super. 330, 237 A. 2d 
903 (1968), in which the arrested person flatly refused 
to submit to a chemical test claiming a lack of under-
standing of the consequences of a refusal, the court held 
that the circumstances did not support his lack of under-
standing. The circumstances of the present case are very 
different. Here, the arrested person gave his consent 
to a particular test, and was led to believe that he had 
the right to the presence of a physician. When that 
presence was proved to not be possible and when the 
arresting officer decided upon another type of test, 
the officer should have ascertained the arrested person's 
understanding of the results of a refusal to this subse-
quent test. The Sidler case is easily distinguishable. 
8 
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Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W. 2d 438 (Iowa 1968), and 
Commonwealth Dept .of Public Safety v. Cheek, 451 S.W. 
2d 394 (Ky. 1970), are not applicable. In the Cheek 
case, the arrested person said "no" when requested to 
submit to a test but claimed to have meant "yes." In 
Janson, supra, the court held that the fact that the ar-
rested person had been acquitted of the criminal charge 
should have no bearing upon the refusal aspects of the 
incident. Neither case has any resemblance to the case at 
hand. 
Likewise, the case of Westmoreland v. Chapman, 74 
Cal. Eptr. 363 (1968), which is cited in Appellant's brief, 
has no application to the present case. In that case, the 
arrested person refused to permit a blood test to be taken 
because the administering technician was not an M.D. 
There is no evidence that Dr. Gassman refused the blood 
test, even though it was to be administered by a techni-
cian rather than a medical person. 
Even the Utah cases dealing with refusal cases are 
not very close to the present situation. McCall v. Dorius, 
527 P.2d 647 (Utah, 1974), was a case in which the ar-
rested person did everything possible to stall and to show 
his lack of understanding of both the Miranda Warning 
and of the implied consent law. This court held that the 
evidence did not uphold the arrested persons' contentions 
as to certain actions by the custodial authorities and that 
his driving privileges were properly revoked for one 
year. It should be noted that the arresting officer in that 
case did everything possible to make the arrested.per-
son understand the nature of the action and the conse-
quences of a refusal, In the present case, no such efforts 
9: 
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were made by Trooper Wilkinson. He merely left after 
Dr. Gassman said "no" to the breathalizer. In McCall, 
$upra, the arresting officer read the implied consent law, 
and the arrested person refused any tests. At that point, 
the officer read it again and explained the consequences 
of a refusal. In that case, the officer fulfilled his statu-
tory obligations as set forth in U.C.A. 41-6-44.10' (1953). 
In the present case, the arresting officer did not. 
Defendant-Appellant's efforts to convert the reason-
ing of Hunter v. Dorms, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877 
(1969), to the case at hand seems strained at best. In 
that case, this court held that the arrested person did 
not refuse to submit to a sobriety test when he said that 
he would take a test after consulting with his attorney. 
This was true even though the officer had already com-
pleted his refusal affidavit. I t should be noted that even 
the arresting officer in that case made sure that the 
arrested person understood the consequences of a refusal 
prior to acceping the same. After arriving at the station 
at approximately 9:15 P.M., the arrested person was 
asked to submit to a test in accordance with the provi-
sions of the statute. But prior to accepting his refusal, 
the officer took the time to once again explain the conse-
quences of a refusal at approximately 9:48 P.M. The 
officer in the Hunter, supra, case was attempting to fufill 
his statutory requirements. 
Thus, it can be seen that none of the cases cited by 
Appellant are controlling of the present case. If any-
thing, they i^oint out the need for an arresting officer 
to attempt to obtain an informed refusal and to attempt 
to clear up any confusion upon the par t of the arrested 
IQ 
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person. This is even more applicable under the terms 
of the applicable statute in the State of Utah, which 
states that the arresting officer must advise a person of. 
his rights after the person refuses. In the present case, 
the confusion was brought about and fostered by the ac-
tions of the arresting officer; therefore, he had an added 
duty to clear up the confusion that he had created. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case of first impression in the State of 
Utah. Prior Utah decisions and decisions from other 
jurisdictions give some guidelines for the decision at 
hand, but none is right on point. The controlling statute, 
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953), created a duty for arresting 
authorities to follow for cases such as the one at hand. 
In the present situation, the arresting officer failed 
to fulfill the clear dictates of this statute. His actions, 
after the reading of the printed form, led Dr. Gassman 
to believe that he had a right to a blood test, and that he 
had the right to have his physician present while said 
blood test was given. Without explanation, the arresting 
officer altered the agreed-to plan of a blood test, and 
requested that Dr. Gassman submit to a breath test, 
which the arresting officer was to perform. When Dr. 
Gassman decided not to submit to a breath test, the 
arresting officer had a statutory duty to once again go 
over the relevant portions of the implied consent statute 
and to advise Dr. Gassman of his rights. His failure to 
do so was a substantive failure to follow the statute, and 
the State should not now be allowed to enforce the re-
maining provisions of the statute against Plaintiff-
Respondent -
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Plaintiff-Eespondent respectfully concludes that the 
decision of the lower court was well reasoned and should 
be upheld. 
Kespectfully submitted, 
DON BLACKHAM and MIKEL M. BOLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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